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DICTA

June, 1951

LIEBHARDT V. AVISON: REMAINDERS
AND REVISION
Three types of remainders will be involved in this comment
on Liebhardt v. Avison: 1
1. "To A for life, remainder to B and his heirs."
2. "To A for life, remainder to B and his heirs, if B survives A."
3. "To A for life, remainder to B and his heirs, but if B dies
before A, then to C and his heirs."
The opinion bases the decision upon the distinction between
type 1 and type 2. It would have been more orthodox had the same
decision been based upon the distinction between type 1 and type 3.
Type 1 is a vested remainder in fee simple absolute. Type 2 is a
contingent remainder, that is, B's survivorship is a condition
precedent to the vesting of the estate in him. Type 3 is a vested
remainder subject to divestment by an executory limitation, that
is, B's failure to survive A is an event which will divest the fee
simple which has been vested in him.
The significance of the distinction between type 2 and type
3 has been stated by the American Law Institute as follows:2
...In some controversies the rule stated [§250 (d)] becomes important because of the difference in the rules applicable respectively to
future interests subject to a condition precedent [type 2] and to future
interests vested subject to complete defeasance [type 3]. This situation exists often in problems of taxation; in questions involving the
destructive operation of the rule against perpetuities; in determining
the possibility of merger between a present interest and a remainder;
in determining whether the interest in question is accelerated upon
the failure of a prior interest, in ascertaining the person entitled to
receive otherwise undisposed of income and in deciding the type of
protection to be accorded to the future interest . . . also . . . in determining the type of reversionary interest left in the conveyor . . .

When such cases have to be decided in Colorado, the opinion
in Liebhardt v. Avison may lead to unorthodox results because it
classifies as contingent remainders [type 2], remainders which,
it is believed, should have been classified as vested subject to divestment [type 3].
The court was using "...
the rule of construction which we
applied in Williams v. Fundingsland, 74 Colo. 315, 321, 221 Pac.
1084, that, 'The use of different words in a will applying to the
same subject matter, indicates that the testator had in view different results'."
'-Colo.-,
229 P. 2d 933 (1951).
The case is not stated because it is assumed
that the reader of this comment has read the opinion.
' RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1940)

§ 250, Comment J.
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This rule was used by the court as a reason for concluding
that since in paragraphs 15 (a), 15 (b), and 16 (b) the testator
used words which created (type 2) contingent remainders, he intended something different, that is, a (type 1) vested remainder
in fee simple absolute, by the different words of paragraph 16 (c).
The same rule could have been used to the same effect, but
with less risk of leading to error in subsequent cases, if the court
had concluded that since in paragraphs 15 (a), 15 (b), and 16
(b) the testator used words which created (type 3) vested remainders subject to divestment by executory limitations, he intended something different, that is, a (type 1) vested remainder
in fee simple absolute, by the different words of paragraph 16 (c).
Paragraphs 15 (a) and (b) will be studied first. There are
five reasons why the remainder which it creates should be classified as (type 3) vested subject to divestment by an executory
limitation.
First: The remainder is "to the issue of Georgia . . . living
at the time of my [the testator's] death . .. ". The identity of each
remainderman was therefore as definitely determined at the death
of the testator as it would have been had he said, "to John,
This
James, and Mary, the children of my niece Georgia."
"present identification" of existing persons as the intended takers
of the remainder tends to establish that survival until the time of
distribution is not a condition precedent.3
Moreover, the express requirement that the remaindermen
be living at a certain time indicates that no such requirement is
to be implied as of a later time. This follows from the rule of
construction which the court was applying. With reference to the
time of his death, the testator used words requiring survivorship;
with reference to the time of distribution, he did not. "The use of
different words in a will applying to the same subject matter, indicates that the testator had in view different results."
Second: The condition precedent which might be inferred
from the words, "Upon the death of both Harry . . . and Georgia"
in the same property
is nullified by the the fact that life estates
4
had been given to Harry and to Georgia.
Third: The condition precedent which might be inferred
from the words, "when they reach the age of twenty-six years" is
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 256, Comment c.
§ 74, note 26, citing twenty-six
SIMES, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (1936)
cases, (a list "by no means exhaustive") including Dowd v. Scally (Iowa) 174 N.W.

938, 940 (1919),

"If there be any one proposition in the law of remainders which may

be regarded as settled, it

is the

one here

stated.

'.

.

. Where the

devise is

to the

remainderman "from and after" or "after" or "at" or "on" the death of the life tenant,
or words of like import are used, the authorities

quite generally

declare that such

words relate to the time of enjoyment, and that the remainder is vested.' "
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nullified by the gift of income from the same property to the same
persons until they reach the age of twenty-six years. 5
Fourth: The words "I give to the issue of Georgia ...living
at the time of my death ... for their absolute property when they
reach the age of 26" afford the basis for inference that the gift
was vested under the rule in Clobberie's Case, ". . . if money
be given to one, to be paid at the age of twenty-one years; there,
if the party dies before, it shall go to [his] executor."'7 Thus the
vesting is immediate, only the enjoyment is postponed.
The same effect should be given to a subsequent phrase, "before receiving the fee title to said real estate and before receiving the principal of said property protective fund and the accumulations thereof." This is paraphrased in the opinion as, "before
receiving the trust property." It is believed that this is a correct
paraphrase. "Recieving the title to said real estate" seems to
refer not to the vesting of the interest, but rather to receiving
the legal title from the trustees; and so also as to receiving the
personal property which had been held in trust.
Furthermore, the term "absolute property" seems more properly to point to a distinction between property that is absolute
(type 1) and property that is subject to defeasance (type 3),
rather than to a distinction between absolute property (type 1)
and no property at all (type 2).
Fifth: The gift over "in case of Georgia ['s] issue living at
my death dying without issue before reaching the age of twentysix years" strongly indicates a vested interest subject to divestment (type 3).
The testator has said that there shall be a gift over if the
remaindermen die without issue before reaching twenty-six. But
what if they die with issue before twenty-six? In such an event
there is no gift over. The inference is that the interest has already
been vested and that it will be a part of of the estate of the
remainderman. 8
It is hoped that this discussion will have pointed out the significance of the italicized words in paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b).
5 RESTATEMENT, supra, § 258, Comment m, "The rule stated in this section is one
of the most potent factors in construction. . . . when this rule is applicable a condition
precedent of survival is thereby eliminated unless extremely strong counterbalancing
factors are present . . the rule is sufficient to change the effect of limitation, which
apart from the gift of income would clearly include a condition precedent of survival."
SMES, supra, § 356, note 44, citing seventeen cases, including Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Rowland, 132 A. 673 (N.J., 1926). ". . . $50,000 in trust . . . to . . . apply
net income to maintenance, support and education of Charles . . . until he attain the
age of thirty years, and upon [Charles] attaining the age of thirty years, I give
[Charles] . . . principal sum of $50,000."

"The authorities are agreed in holding that legacies in terms of the one under

consideration are vested. .
. The trustee is advised that the legacy vested in Charles
. . . and upon his death passed to his administrators . . . although [Charles] would
not now be thirty had he lived."
82 Vent. 342 (1677).

See also in accord, with respect to land as well as to personalty: RESTATEMENT,
supra, § 257, particularly illustration 1, and SIMES, supra, § 355, note 37, citing fifteen
cases.
8RESTATEMENT,
$
supra,
§ 254, particularly, illustration 3 and comment b, "The
force of the tendency stated in [§ 254a, that 'the restricted requirement of survival

Is a basis for the defeasance of such interest rather than a condition precedent
thereof] is very strong, being counteracted only in rare situations."
SIMES, supra.

§ 358.
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(a) The net income of said real estate I give, devise and bequeath
to Harry G. Liebhardt and Georgia Liebhardt Temple, share and share
alike, for their natural lives.
Upon and after ten (10) years from the date of my death, the
net income from the said property protective fund and the accumulations thereof I give, devise and bequeath to Harry G. Liebhardt
and Georgia Liebhardt Temple, for their natural lives, share and
share alike.
In the event that Harry G. Liebhardt dies before Georgia Liebhardt Temple, then and in that event the entire net income of the
said property protective fund and the accumulations thereof, after
ten (10) years from the date of my death, and the entire net income
of said real estate, I give, devise and bequeath to Georgia Liebhardt
Temple, for her natural life.
Upon the death of Georgia Liebhardt Temple, either before or
after the death of Harry G. Liebhardt, her share of said net income
of said real estate and of the said property protective fund and the
accumulations thereof, I give, devise and bequeath to her issue living
at the time of my death, share and share alike.
All of said income herein bequeathed and devised shall be paid
to the beneficiaries quarter-annually.
Upon the death of both Harry G. Liebhardt and Georgia Liebhardt
Temple, all of said above described real estate and the income therefrom, and the said property protective fund and the accumulations
thereof, I give, devise and bequeath to the issue of Georgia Liebhardt Temple living at the time of my death, share and share alike,
for their absolute property, when they reach the age of twenty-six
(26) years.
(b) Upon the death of said Harry G. Liebhardt and Georgia
Liebhardt Temple, and in case of Georgia Liebhardt Temple's issue
living at the time of my death dying without issue before reaching
the age of twenty-six (26) years and before receiving the fee title
to said real estate and before receiving the principal of said property
protective fund and the accumulations thereof, then the share of the
income theretofore received by said issue of Georgia Liebhardt Temple
I give, devise and bequeath, as follows: one-half thereof to the German Protestant Churches of Denver, Colorado and the English
Lutheran Churches of Denver, Colorado, share and share alike, and
the other one-half thereof to the Evangelical Lutheran Sanitarium
located in Jefferson County, Colorado. If said German Protestant
Churches of Denver have ceased to exist, then the said share of said
income bequeathed to them I give, devise and bequeath to said English
Lutheran Churches of Denver, share and share alike.

With respect to this part of the will the court said, "It thus
becomes evident . . . that he [testator] could, and did, by apt
language, defer the vesting of a remainder to a time subsequent
to his own death, making such vesting dependent upon the survival of the remaindermen until such time, and direct the disposition of the remainder in the event of the death of the remaindermen prior to the time fixed for such vesting. We can only conclude that the testator himself had fully in mind the difference
between a contingent [type 2] and a vested [type 1] remainder."
It would have involved less risk of error in future cases if
the court had said, " It thus becomes evident . . . that he [testator] could, and did, by apt language provide for the divesting
of a remainder at a time subsequent to his own death, making
such divestment dependent upon the failure of the remaindermen
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to survive until such time, and direct the disposition of the interest in the event of the remaindermen without issue prior to
the time fixed. We can only conclude that the testator himself had
fully in mind the difference between an absolutely vested remainder [type 1] and a remainder subject to divestment [type 3].
So far this comment has been confined to the court's reference
to paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b). The same sort of comment should
be made concerning the court's reference to paragraph 16 (b). The court treats paragraph 16 (b) as a type 2 contingent
remainder, whereas it would have been orthodox to treat it as a
type 3 vested remainder subject to divestment by an executory
limitation. There are four reasons for this conclusion.
First: The remainderman is identified (by name) at the
death of the testator.9
Second: The condition precedent which might be inferred
from the phrase, "Upon the death of Georgia," is explained by
referring it to that part of the property in which Georgia had
been given an estate for life.' 0
Third: The condition precedent which might be inferred
from the words, "when . . . Jack . . . shall have reached the age
of thirty years," is nullified by the gift of income, part to be paid
to him, and the excess to be accumulated for him until he reached
the age of thirty. 11 The rule is the same even12 though only a part
of the income is to be given for maintenance.
Fourth: The gift over "upon the death of Jack ... without
issue, before being entitled to receive and before receiving said
property" justifies the inference that an interest has been vested
in Jack upon the death of the testator, and that it 3is to be divested only by his death before thirty, without issue.'
The language of paragraph 16 (b) is as follows: (The
words which have been discussed are italicized.)
Upon the death of both Minnie K. Liebhardt and Laura L. Liebhardt, I give, devise and bequeath the net income of the undivided
one-half interest in and to said Lots seventeen (17), eighteen (18)
and nineteen (19), Block one hundred sixty-one (161), East Denver,
to my niece, Georgia Liebhardt Temple, for and during her natural
life and to her son Jack Liebhardt Temple, share and share alike,
to be paid as hereinafter provided. The share of said net income
belonging to Georgia Liebhardt Temple shall be paid to her by said
successors in trust quarter-annually. The share of said net income
belonging to Jack Liebhardt Temple shall be paid to him by said
successors in trust at the rate of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00)
per month, until he reaches the age of twenty-six (26) years, and
between the age of twenty-six (26) and thirty (30) years, the said
share of said net income shall be paid to him by said successors in
trust at the rate of Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per month.
The excess of said net income belonging to Jack Liebhardt Temple
over and above said Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month,
and over and above said Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per month,
respectively, shall be invested and held in trust for him by said
OSee Supra, first reason as to paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b).
10See Supra, first reason as to paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b).
"See Supra, third reason as to paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b).
12SIMES, supra, § 356, note 45.
USee Supra, fifth reason as to paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b).
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sucessors in trust until he reaches the age of thirty (30) years, and
when he reaches the age of thirty (30) years, said excess of income,
and the accumulations thereof, shall he paid to him as his own
property.
Upon the death of Georgia Liebhardt Temple, and when said
Jack Liebhardt Temple shall have reached the age of thirty (30)
years, then the entire undivided one-half interest in and to said Lots
seventeen (17), eighteen (18) and nineteen (19), Block one hundred
sixty-one (161), East Denver, shall be turned over and conveyed to
said Jack Liebhardt Temple as and for his absolute property.
Upon the death of Georgia Liebhardt Temple, and upon -the
death of Jack Liebhardt Temple without issue, before being entitled
to receive and before receiving said property as above provided,
then the net income of said undivided one-half interest in said Lots
seventeen (17), eighteen (18) and nineteen (19), Block one hundred
sixty-one (161), East Denver, shall be distributed, and I give, devise
and bequeath the said net income as follows: one-eighth of said net
income to the City and County of Denver, Colorado, to maintain a
water and field lily garden in Washington Park; five eighths of said
net income to the Protestant Orphanages of Denver, Colorado, share
and share alike, and one-fourth of said net income to be paid, yearly,
to the Town of McGregor, Iowa, for park purposes.

As to this the court said, ". . . testator indicated that he
knew how to provide for an estate which should not vest immediately . . . Thus in section (b) there is a provision for deferment of vesting (type 2). Jack Liebhardt Temple had to live to
be thirty years of age before taking. Then follows a provision
for conveyance over if the conditions for the deferred vesting are
not fulfilled."
It would have been less conducive to error if the court had
said, ". . . testator indicated that he knew how to provide
for an estate which would not vest absolutely . . . Thus in section
(b) there is a provision for divestment (type 3). Jack Liebhardt
Temple had to live to be thirty years of age or had to die with issue
in order to prevent divestment. Then follows a provision for conveyance over if the conditions for the divestment are fulfilled."
It seems strange that this idea of vesting subject to divestment (type 3) as opposed to absolute vesting does not appear in
the court's reasoning. It quotes the conclusions of law of the trial
court wherein the idea is twice expressed: ".

.

. Fred . . . and

Harry . . . each took an indefeasibly vested remainder . . .;" and
"... Fred . . . and Harry . . . each took an indefeasibly vested
interest."
Furthermore, the Brief and Argument of Defendants in
Error contained this language: "We shall now demonstrate that
the language of this subparagraph (c) is the language of immediate and absolute vesting . . . ;" and ".

.

. unless the expressed

intention of the testator clearly appears in the will to the contrary, an absolute, rather than a qualified, a vested rather than a
contingent, interest or estate is created."
There is another part of the opinion from which an erroneous inference may be drawn:
Counsel argue that the interest which Harry . . . took should
be treated as a lapsed legacy . . . This argument could only be applicable in the event that Harry ['s) . . . interest . . . was a contingent,
instead of a vested remainder. It cannot apply as long as Harry
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. .. has a vested remainder, because if it is the latter it then becomes
part of his estate and is disposed of by his will. .."

This seems to be based upon the assumption that no contingent remainder can be inherited or devised. There is much
authority to the contrary. 14 Of course if the contingency is the
survival of the remainderman until some future time and he dies
too soon, the contingency can never happen, and it is for that
reason that no remainder goes to his heir or devisee.
A similar observation should be made with reference to the
apparent implication that every vested remainder goes to the
heir or devisee of the remainderman. Not so, obviously, if the
remainder were an estate for the life of the remainderman; and
for the same reason, not so if the vested remainder were divested
by the death of the remainderman under circumstances which fell
within the terms of the executory limitation, as, for example, the
death of Jack before thirty without issue.
One more point. The court says, ". . . We believe also that
the rule laid down in our statute, section 4, [article 1], chapter
40, '35 C. S. A. . . .is applicable here . . .We recently applied
that rule in Garvin v. Ruston, 121 Colo. 494, 218 P. 2d 1064."
But section 47, article 1, chapter 40, '35 C. S. A. says, "This article
shall not be so construed as to embrace last wills and testaments."
This case, Liebhardt v. Avison, involves a will. Garvin v. Ruston
involved a partnership agreement, not a will.
If anyone should read this far prior to 1953, it might be well
for him to ask some member of the Commission on Statute Revision to read the preceding paragraph.
T. G. M.
PERSONALS
Bernard E. Engler has removed his law offices from the Equitable Bldg. to the Majestic Bldg. Benjamin C. Hilliard, Jr., and
Barkley L. Clanahan will continue as partners at 242 Equitable
Bldg. under the firm name of Hilliard & Clanahan, with James J.
Delaney and Robert L. Knous as associates.
John L. Griffith, formerly Clerk of the Denver County Court,
is resuming the practice of law in partnership with Mary C. Griffith in the Midland Savings Building. Judge David Brofman appointed William B. Miller to be Clerk of the Court following Mr.
Griffith's resignation.
at the present time, with the exception of
14 SIMES, supra, § 732, note 12, "...
Maryland, it is everywhere held that remainders, whether vested or contingent . . .

descend in the same manner and to the same persons as possessory interests in land...'

§ 731, note 10, reads, "It is clear that, with the exception if possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry for condition broken, all varieties of future interests whether vested
or contingent are alienable by will in the United States."
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 164 and § 165.

